Governing MPAs
- getting the balance right
Where should the governance ‘steer’ come from?

State steer – government and law

Market steer – capitalism and economies

People steer – communities and civil society
Governance is not just:-

‘What governments do to govern’

‘Government by and through markets’

‘Governing without governments’

It is a combination of the three, as appropriate to a given context
Growing recognition in governance debates that there is a need to move beyond ideological arguments as to which approach is ‘right’

: develop governance models, frameworks and approaches that combine the role of states, markets and people
Governance of Protected Areas: Co-management

Local communities and the state work on a partnership basis to sustainably exploit natural resources and conserve protected areas, potentially involving all three approaches.

In protected area co-management, debates continue as to the relative emphasis that should be placed on:

- state steer: ‘top-down’
- people steer: ‘bottom-up’
- markets steer: economic incentives, including property rights

All three approaches have a role and very few, if any, PAs can be successfully governed solely through any one approach: need to combine
Co-management also the recommended approach for MPAs

IUCN MPA Guidance (1999)
Combine top-down & bottom-up approaches

IUCN MPA Network Guidance (2008)
Recommends both top-down & bottom-up approaches

…but what does “design and management of MPAs must be both top-down and bottom-up” (Kelleher 1999) actually mean in practice?
The need for MPAs to fulfil marine biodiversity &/or fisheries conservation objectives is now quite widely accepted.

Debates moving on to how we can design networks of MPAs, and the knowledge-base and guidance is rapidly developing.

Also a need to develop knowledge-base and guidance on how to effectively manage or govern MPAs.
As MPAs are scaled-up to networks, the challenges of governing them increase, as there arguably must be a degree of coordination, including some control from higher institutional levels: national-regional-global, in order to address ecological linkages and inter-dependencies between MPAs, as well as addressing mobile and incoming users.
There is considerable guidance on how to manage MPAs, using management cycle approaches.

… but the challenges are in-between the boxes and the arrows:

: adaptive co-management cycle approach does not really address governance processes and issues:

How do you combine the role of people, state & markets?

Fig. 1. Six steps for active and adaptive management of marine reserves for fishery purposes.

Analytical framework for MPAG case studies

Systematic programme of case study analyses with the aim of:

- identifying examples of good practice in terms of which combinations of governance approaches are effective in achieving conservation objectives;

- assessing their transferability to other MPA contexts;

- producing a guide to different approaches to governing MPAs and how they might be effectively combined or ‘blended’
MPAG analytical framework

- Context
- Objectives
- Drivers/Conflicts
- Governance Framework/Approach
- **Effectiveness** (0-5)
- Incentives employed & needed: Economic, Interpretative, Knowledge, Legal, Participative

: how incentives combined, relative importance, etc

- Cross cutting themes: role of leadership, role of NGOs, equity issues, role of stewardship/proprietorship, etc
Case studies assigned to one of five ‘governance approach’ categories

Approach I - MPAs managed primarily by the government under a clear legal framework (government-led)

Approach II - MPAs managed by the government with significant decentralisation and/or influences from private organisations (decentralised governance)

Approach III - MPAs managed primarily by local communities under collective management arrangements (community-led)

Approach IV - MPAs managed primarily by the private sector &/or NGOs granted with property/management rights (private-led)

Approach V - No clearly recognisable effective governance framework in place (ineffective)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MPA governance approach</th>
<th>Case Study MPA name</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Per Capita GDP(^1) US$</th>
<th>Nat. gov. capacity(^2)</th>
<th>Effectiveness(^3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(I) Managed primarily by the government under clear legal framework</td>
<td>Great Barrier Reef Marine Park</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>38,900</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Darwin Mounds Marine Special Area for Conservation</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North East Kent European Marine Site</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wash &amp; North Norfolk Coast European Marine Site</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Marine Sanctuaries</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>48,000</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>California MPAs under the MLPA</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>48,000</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>Too early to assess</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^2\) National governance capacity derived by averaging the scores for the six governance indicators estimated by the World Bank (Kaufmann et al. 2009) for each country

\(^3\) Scale of 0-5, in some cases allocated by MPAG researchers
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MPA governance approach</th>
<th>Case Study MPA name</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Per Capita GDP' US$</th>
<th>Nat. gov. capacity²</th>
<th>Effectiveness³</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(II) Managed by the government with significant decentralisation and/or influences from private organisations</td>
<td>Sanya Coral Reef National Marine Nature Reserve</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>6,100</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seaflower MPA</td>
<td>San Andres Archipelago, Colombia</td>
<td>9,300</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Galápagos Marine Reserve</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>7,600</td>
<td>-0.86</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Karimunjawa Marine National Park</td>
<td>Indonesia (Coral Triangle)</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wakatobi National Park</td>
<td>Indonesia (Coral Triangle)</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park</td>
<td>Philippines (Coral Triangle)</td>
<td>3,400</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ha Long Bay World Heritage Site</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPA governance approach</td>
<td>Case Study MPA name</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Nat. Per Capita GDP</td>
<td>Nat. gov. capacity&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Effectiveness&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(III) Managed primarily by local communities under collective management arrangements</td>
<td>Os Minarzos Marine Reserve</td>
<td>Galicia, Spain</td>
<td>35,500</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Isla Natividad MPA</td>
<td>Baja California</td>
<td>14,400</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(IV) MPAs managed primarily by the private sector and/or NGOs granted with property/</td>
<td>Great South Bay Marine Conservation Area</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>48,000</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>management rights</td>
<td>Chumbe Island Coral Park</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(V) No clearly recognisable effective governance framework in place</td>
<td>Baleia Franca Environmental Protection Area</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>10,300</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pirajubaé Marine Extractive Reserve</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>10,300</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cres-Lošinj Special Zoological Reserve</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>18,600</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Economic Incentives** - Using economic and property rights approaches to promote the fulfilment of MPA objectives (10 incentives): *market steer*

**Interpretative incentives** - Promoting awareness of the conservation features of the MPA, the related objectives for conserving them and the policies for achieving these objectives, and promoting support for related measures (3 incentives): *supporting all three approaches*

**Knowledge incentives** - Respecting and promoting the use of different sources of knowledge (local/traditional and expert/scientific) to better inform MPA decisions (4 incentives): *supporting all three approaches*

**Legal incentives** - Use of relevant laws, regulations, etc. as a source of ‘state steer’ to promote compliance with decisions & thereby the achievement of MPA obligations (11 incentives): *state steer*

**Participative incentives** - Providing for users, communities and other interest groups to participate in and influence MPA decision-making that may potentially affect them in order to promote their ‘ownership’ of the MPA and thereby their potential to cooperate in the implementation of decisions (12 incentives): *people steer* (Total 40 incentives)
Each case study also has an ‘essence’ report (App 1, Vol 1) and a summary report (Vol 2)
Results from all case studies

All Governance Approaches (20 case studies)
Results from all case studies

Incentives USED in rank order (all 20 case studies)

Incentive labels on x-axis refer to list on pages 20-25 of main report

- **Yellow**: Interpretative
- **Blue**: Economic
- **Gray**: Knowledge
- **Red**: Legal
- **Green**: Participative
Results from all case studies

Incentives NEEDED in rank order (all 20 case studies)

- Legal
- Knowledge
- Participative
- Economic
Conclusions

• Overall, economic incentives were the most frequently cited category as being used to contribute to MPA governance, along with legal, knowledge, interpretative and participative incentives.

• Legal incentives were the most frequently cited category as being needed.

• It is important to combine the reinforcing role of legal incentives with the cementing role of economic, knowledge, participative and interpretative incentives if the governance framework for a given MPA is to be resilient to the perturbing effects of existing and emergent driving forces.
• Having dedicated and respected individuals and organisations that can provide vision and leadership for an MPA is an important source of steer in developing and sustaining good MPA governance, but **strong leadership from representatives of the state is particularly important**, in order to provide for the development and effective implementation of legal incentives.

• NGOs can serve an important role in developing and implementing various incentives for the effective governance of MPAs, but they are **not a substitute for the leadership role of the state**, particularly with regards to the need for legal incentives to reinforce MPA governance frameworks.
Effectiveness and equity in MPA governance are inextricably intertwined and a balance must be struck between providing for a reasonable standard of living for local communities, through controlled access to the resources in an MPA, alternative livelihoods, etc, and ensuring that MPA resources are not over-exploited.

Karimunjawa MPA (Wildlife Conservation Society)
Without community stewardship or ‘ownership’ of an MPA, incentives aimed at generating support from local resource users are less likely to be successful. One important means of promoting community stewardship is to provide for protection from incoming users, including through the allocation of legally enforced community property rights, in combination with other incentives.
Driving forces are a major and increasing challenge for MPA governance, as they represent forces that can combine to perturb, disrupt and, ultimately, collapse the governance framework, severely undermining, if not destroying, the potential for the biodiversity and resource conservation objectives of a given MPA to be achieved.

- increasing reach and numbers of tourists and increasing pressures for large-scale corporate tourism;

- increasing reach of large-scale fish markets for a growing and increasingly affluent human population coupled with the increasing reach and effort capacity of fishing vessels through ‘technological creep’;

- increasing mobility of people and thereby the increasing potential for migration to coastal areas, where economic development and subsistence opportunities tend to be relatively good; and

- increasing and legitimate desire of the (growing) local population, to not only feed themselves and their families on a subsistence basis, but also to improve their material standard of living and their prospects, as people increasingly aspire to a more secure, comfortable, consumerist and technological western lifestyle.
Whilst economic, interpretative, knowledge and participative incentives can complement the role of the state, they are **not a substitute** for a degree of state control, as **legal incentives are critically important** in order to ensure that MPAs can withstand the perturbing effects of driving forces.
In the face of strong driving forces, the combined use of a diversity of inter-connected incentives makes MPA governance frameworks more resilient...

... but **without strong legal incentives to reinforce the MPA governance framework, it is inherently unstable**. Resilience in MPA governance frameworks is therefore **woven by complex webs connecting incentives from all five categories**, legal incentives providing essential strong and reinforcing links.

--

Recognising the need to combine incentives from different categories, the divide between top-down, bottom-up and market approaches to MPA governance becomes blurred.

Incentives from all of these approaches can be well integrated and allowed to co-evolve in governance frameworks to provide for more resilient, equitable and effective approaches to MPA governance.

The emphasis thus becomes one of combining the use of as great a diversity of incentives as feasible in order to develop a governance framework that is more resilient to the perturbing effects of driving forces.

This project indicates that by ‘deconstructing’ MPA governance into different categories of incentives and governance approaches, the structures, strengths and weaknesses of MPA governance can be analysed in a more systematic way.
It is envisaged that there will be three ways in which the MPAG initiative can be taken forward:

• technical report can be used as guidance for assessing governance issues in any given MPA, particularly the menu of 40 incentives, which serves as a list of potentially applicable governance approaches, coupled with the case studies describing how they have been combined in different contexts and which incentives were particularly needed;

• the findings of this phase of the MPAG initiative can be applied in a more in-depth manner to a smaller number of case studies, in order to test and refine them; and

• this MPAG analysis framework can be applied on a meta-analysis basis to a larger sample of MPA case studies and the findings added to these to produce an expanding database of case studies, in order to further develop and refine the framework and the findings, and to produce an analysis of MPA governance issues based on a larger sample
Governing Marine Protected Areas

Getting the Balance Right

Technical Report