



Incentive driven management of fisheries

– a tool for developing countries?



What is the goals we should look for

- Maximum Sustainable Yield or maximum economic result
- Sustaining a population

- Through a struggle of forces?
 - by "regulation and control"

Or

- By exploiting a common interest?
 - introducing: Rights, Incentives and Accountability



2. The problem – in headlines

1. Management does not address the over capacity i fleets properly
2. Impact (environmental footprint) is not documented
3. Fishers have little incentive to fish in a sustainable way



3.1. A solution for overcapacity

Thesis: Sustainability cannot be achieved unless fishers can adapt fishing opportunities to changing conditions

Solution: Fishers or fishers coop's should be allowed to pool, swap or trade allocations (ITQ-like management)

Result: A fleet in balance, economic efficiency. Money wasted on excess vessel tonnage and fuel can be directed towards societal needs – e.g. in the form of fish reserved for coastal fleets.

Note: Subsistence fishers need not be regulated if their impact is low

Info: Annex 1: Checklist for implementation of ITQ systems



Is transferable fishing rights
enough to ensure sustainability?

No

It will balance capacity to catch opportunities

- but it does not encourage selective fishing, and it is not a panacea against discarding, misreporting etc.



3.2. A solution for sustainability

Thesis: If the fishers economy depends on how much he can land he will upgrade. If his economy depends on how he uses his total catch he will fish selectively

Solution: Give the fisher increased catch quotas if he can document all his catches. Let all catches count on his quota and negotiate management objectives for protected species (should be modulated for developing countries)

Result: Correct outtake and biological data from the stock. User driven development of selective fishing. Access to certified markets.



Discussion

Rights and transferability are necessary, but they can be limited in time and content, and they should be “contractually” conditioned by performance in relation to sustainability.

The owner of the right can be an individual a cooperative or a community. The crucial point is whether the relevant judicial entity can demonstrate accountability vis á vis the management framework

Allocation. Given, that there are too many fishermen and too few fish someone HAS to leave the fishery. A combination of an allocation model and accompanying social and structural changes seems to be the only but vague solution for developing areas at the bottom of the economic scale

The global perspective



Wednesday, October 8, 2008 | Mercopress

Fisheries depletion & poor management costs 50 billion USD

The world's fishing fleets are losing billions of dollars each year through depleted stocks and poor management, according to a UN report. The World Bank and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) calculate the losses at 50 billion US dollars per year.

Half the world's fishing fleet could be scrapped with no change in catch.



Vessels with camera



555 Kingfisher





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Reform of national fisheries policy
Reform of national aquaculture policy
ICES Council 1996 – 2005
CFP Revisions in 1992 and 2002
Common Fisheries Policy 1983

See more at www.fvm.dk/yieldoffish